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When	public	agencies	are	free	to	decide,
entrepreneurs	are	more	likely	to	get	a	licence
It	is	well	established	that	government	regulation	of	markets	can	pose	significant	barriers	to	entry.	Entrepreneurs	are
disproportionately	burdened	by	regulation	not	only	because	they	lack	resources	and	familiarity	to	navigate
regulatory	hoops,	but	also	because	policies	designed	to	regulate	markets	are	often	influenced	by	and	for	the	benefit
of	incumbent	firms.
However,	despite	this	disadvantage,	entrepreneurs	do	manage	to	enter	regulated	markets	with	some	frequency.
We	sought	to	investigate	under	what	conditions	entrepreneurs	could	enter	regulated	markets	in	the	absence	of
formal	policy	changes	to	reduce	regulatory	barriers.	Taking	a	nuanced	(pluralistic)	view	of	government	that	looks
not	just	at	elected	officials	but	also	at	regulatory	agencies	that	implement	laws,	we	examine	regulatory	discretion—
the	flexibility	that	agency	bureaucrats	have	to	interpret	and	implement	policy—and	explore	its	role	in	influencing
market	entry	of	new	ventures.
Elected	officials	delegate	varying	amounts	of	discretion	to	agency	bureaucrats	to	implement	laws	for	a	couple	of
reasons.	First,	policymakers	are	generally	not	well-versed	in	the	subject	matter	of	the	new	law,	whereas	agencies
are	staffed	with	technical	experts	who	have	more	information.	Second,	because	writing	detailed	policy	requires
much	time	and	effort,	elected	officials	would	rather	delegate	discretion	to	regulators	to	fill	in	the	details	so	they	can
spend	their	time	on	activities	that	facilitate	re-election.
At	the	same	time,	agency	bureaucrats	and	elected	officials	have	differing	motivations.	Findings	in	the	public
administration	literature	suggest	that	the	former	is	generally	motivated	to	maximise	social	welfare	and	the	agency’s
mission,	whereas	the	latter	is	motivated	to	maximise	the	likelihood	of	reelection.	The	tension	created	by	these
differences	manifests	itself	in	how	policies	are	implemented	with	respect	to	firms.	When	agency	bureaucrats	are
given	little	discretion,	incumbent	firms	benefit	more	from	regulatory	decisions	than	new	ventures	due	to	their
political	influence	over	elected	officials	and	market	power.
However,	where	discretion	is	high,	agency	bureaucrats	can	be	guided	more	by	a	public	service	motivation	that
emphasises	neutrality	and	equity	in	policy	implementation	and	insulates	them	from	pressure	from	elected	officials,
who	may	be	lobbied	on	behalf	of	incumbent	firms.	As	greater	discretion	decreases	the	political	influence	of
incumbents,	it	levels	the	playing	field	for	entrepreneurs	and	leads	to	more	favourable	regulatory	decisions	and
market	entry.
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Empirically,	we	examine	regulatory	licensing	decisions	of	new	hydroelectric	power	facilities	in	the	United	States
from	1978	through	2014.	The	results	show	that	where	discretion	is	high,	entrepreneurs	are	48%	more	likely	to
receive	licensing	relative	to	incumbents	and	22.5%	sooner,	based	on	an	average	wait	time	of	4.5	years.	These
entrepreneurial	hydro	facilities	can	make	up	to	$7740	per	day,	so	that	computes	to	$2.8	million	in	revenue	gained
through	faster	licensing.
This	paper	has	a	number	of	implications	for	entrepreneurs,	incumbent	firms,	and	public	policy.	For	entrepreneurs,	it
informs	how	they	might	better	navigate	regulatory	agency	interactions	by	choosing	to	enter	markets	in	states	and
regions	in	which	regulators	have	greater	discretion.	For	incumbent	firms,	because	high	discretion	reduces	the
effectiveness	of	their	financial	lobbying—by	28	per	cent	according	to	our	findings—they	should	pursue	other	forms
of	corporate	political	influence.	For	elected	officials,	the	promotion	of	innovation,	entrepreneurship,	and
environmentally	sustainable	business	practices	has	become	a	key	element	of	many	state	and	federal	policy
agendas,	yet	studies	have	found	mixed	results	of	many	of	these	laws.	Instead	of	focusing	on	the	policy,	elected
officials	should	first	examine	how	regulatory	agencies	are	structured	and	how	the	policies	are	implemented.
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Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	“State	Agency	Discretion	and	Entrepreneurship	in	Regulated
Markets”	in	Administrative	Science	Quarter,	2020.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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